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Preface
Hundreds or even thousands of international legal instruments on "the environment" are
in existence.  What happens to international environmental agreements once they are
signed, and how does the process of implementing such agreements influence their
effectiveness?  These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation
and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)".  Research teams
are examining these questions from many angles and with different methods.
One factor that influences whether some agreements are effective is the extent to which
they may include provisions for verification of compliance.  Although this has been a
central issue in the analysis of arms control agreements, until recently verification of
international environmental agreements has been relatively neglected.  Yet many
environmental agreements would probably be more effective if they included better
provisions for determining whether a party is in compliance and for managing problems of
inadequate performance and noncompliance.
In this paper, Owen Greene analyzes the factors that determine whether an environmental
agreement is "verifiable".  He decomposes the general concept of verifiability into its
constituent properties; notably, he explores the intrinsic verifiability of different substances
and behaviors.  He suggests that proxies can be used in international agreements to improve
the verifiability of the agreement by simplifying what must be verified and by tuning the
terms of the agreement to indicators that are more easily measured and verified.  
Greene also examines the ways that "verifiability" could affect the formation of
international agreements as well as their implementation.  Further, he shows how the
verifiability of an agreement can change over time--either by design or due to changes, e.g.,
in technology or the cost of gathering and analyzing information.  Throughout, he shows
the many pathways by which verifiability might influence the effectiveness of an
agreement.
This paper is part of IEC’s work on international verification and review mechanisms. 
IEC is now sponsoring several case-studies related to these topics.
vThe context of this paper in the IEC project
This paper is one of several IEC working papers that survey the existing literature, place
the project in a framework of prior research, and identify the major questions that deserve
further study.  At the outset, members of the project decided to prepare these papers to
ensure that we were adequately aware of other research in the field and, especially, to
ensure that we would be studying the most important questions in the proper context.  The
papers that play these roles are listed below, divided into each of the three areas of IEC’s
research program.  Fuller descriptions of different parts of IEC’s research program are
available in the IEC project description (copies available from IEC) and in the prefaces and
working papers listed below.
1. Historical case-study and comparative research
Most of IEC’s research is directed at studying how international environmental
agreements have been implemented historically through examination of case-
studies and focussed comparisons among selected cases.  Teams are studying
domestic implementation as well as international and transnational processes.  Eight
papers review the relevant literature and establish the context and research
questions:
  Research on implementation at the domestic level in Western Europe and in
the Eastern economies undergoing transformation:
  o Steinar Andresen, Jon Birger Skjærseth, and Jørgen Wettestad, 1994,
"Regime, the State and Society--Analysing the Implementation of
International Environmental Commitments".
  o Vladimir Kotov, 1994, "Implementation and Effectiveness of
International Environmental Regimes During the Process of Economic
Transformation in Russia".
  o Elena Nikitina, 1994, "Domestic Implementation of International
Environmental Commitments: a Review of Soviet Literature".
  o Alexei Roginko, 1994, "Domestic Compliance with International
Environmental Agreements: a Review of Current Literature".
Research on international and transnational processes of implementation:
  o David G. Victor with Owen J. Greene, John Lanchbery, Juan Carlos di
Primio and Anna Korula, 1994, "Roles of Review Mechanisms in the
Effective Implementation of International Environmental Agreements".  
  o David G. Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene, 1994, "An
Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms: Report on Work in Progress".
  o David G. Victor with Anna Korula, 1994, "What Is an International
Environmental Agreement?"
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  o Owen J. Greene, 1994, "On Verifiability, and How It Could Matter for
International Environmental Agreements".
2. Development of a database
IEC is developing a database that will consist of key variables related to the
development and effective implementation of international agreements.  It will
allow systematic use of historical evidence from a large number of cases.  The goal
is to make possible the testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general conclusions
about which variables are causally linked to "effectiveness".  One paper reviews the
major hypotheses related to the formation and effectiveness of international
regimes:
  o Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 1994, "The Study of
International Regimes".
3. Other research and policy activities
IEC researchers are applying their research findings to current and future policy
issues as opportunities arise.  The project is also sponsoring a major
simulation-gaming exercise to explore issues of institutional design, implementation
and compliance in international environmental agreements.  Simulations can help
promote creative thinking about political options for international management of
climate change, identify potential pitfalls, integrate policy-relevant knowledge from
a variety of domains, and identify important policy-relevant knowledge needs.  One
paper surveys the benefits of using simulation-gaming as a policy and research tool:
  o Edward A. Parson, 1995, "Why Study Hard Policy Problems With
Simulation-Gaming?"
The above list includes only the papers that the project has used in establishing the
framework for its research activities.  A complete list of publications and copies of papers
are available from the IEC offices at IIASA.
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SUMMARY
Verification and implementation review processes are potentially important factors in the
effectiveness of environmental regimes, and yet until recently they have  received relatively
little attention. This paper examines one aspect of  this issue area: the characteristics and
determinants of ‘verifiability’, and ways in which it could affect the development and
effectiveness of  international environmental agreements. It aims to clarify and explore these
issues, and to identify areas worthy of  further research. 
Definitions
The verification process involves monitoring national performance and then, on the basis of
the information obtained,  assessing compliance with international commitments. Since
verifiability is the ability to verify compliance, it is thus a combination of monitorability  -
 the ability to monitor the activities or substances covered by the commitment - and
assessability; the ability to compare monitored performance with the standards set by the
commitment. For the purposes of this paper, verification is not simply about whether or not a
party is in compliance, but also about the extent to which it is complying with commitments. It
is carried out by states or organisations other than the party whose performance is being
assessed, implying that the monitoring or assessment processes involved should have some
degree of independence from the party concerned. 
Determinants of verifiability
The verifiability of  a commitment depends partly on the extent to which  the relevant
activities or substances are already transparent to interested observers. In some cases, the 
processes of monitoring, data-gathering, information-exchange and review that exist
independently of the treaty in question are already sufficient for at least some outsiders to be
able to monitor parties’ performance in relation to a commitment. Frequently, however,
verifiability depends on the extent to which additional monitoring or assessment facilities are
in place. 
The determinants of ‘monitorability’ of the substances or activities relevant to compliance can
roughly be divided into three categories. The first of these is the intrinsic  monitorability,
which  depends partly on the physical or ‘natural’ characteristics of the activities or
phenomena to be measured. It also depends on their social or economic characteristics -
 on the place they have in the societies involved in the agreement - and on the extent to which
relevant natural and social sciences and monitoring techniques have been developed. On the
basis of present scientific and technical knowledge, it is possible to develop a generic list of 
physical and social characteristics of ‘Substance X’ or ‘Activity Y’ that would determine their
intrinsic monitorability. This could usefully clarify which types of commitments in a given
environmental issue area are likely to prove verifiable, and thus the scope for effective
environmental agreements in this area.
The second category of determinants relate to the extent to which an adequate ‘infrastructure’
of monitoring platforms, data-collection systems, and expertise already exists and is available
for use. In principle, custom-built systems could be established for each treaty, but in practice
the resources available for this are very limited. As is well known,  the characteristics of the
data-gathering systems and the institutions with which they are associated will typically affect
the data they produce. This creates reliability problems which need to be taken into account,
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and also problems of comparability of results between countries and regions. To a limited
extent, these can be reduced by careful formulation of commitments
Thirdly, monitorability is determined by broader political, social or economic characteristics
of the states involved, such as the extent to which states are open, pluralist, democratic, or
strong domestically, or the character of their economic, cultural or social systems. The
implications of these societal characteristics for monitorability depends on the extent to which
adequate monitoring depends on data provided by the state concerned or on its cooperation
(and whether the rules for such cooperation have been formally agreed). 
Where verification issues are salient, there are likely to be doubts about the monitorability of
commitments if it depends on self-reporting by governments, which could misreport in order
to hide poor compliance. However, if the state’s national data-gathering process is
transparent, and outside observers  have access to raw data or to the various government
agencies or experts involved, then confidence in verifiability should increase.  Appropriate
transparency rules could be included in environmental agreements for this purpose.
Nevertheless, parties may not accept some commitments to be monitorable unless national
reports can at least be validated through independent inspections or compared with
independently-collected data.
Where direct monitoring of the phenomena specifically governed by commitments is difficult,
it may be possible to overcome the problem through indirect monitoring. Here, a
methodology is used to calculate the phenomenon of interest using data on a set of relatively
monitorable quantities. In this case, monitorability depends on the existence of an acceptable
methodology, as well as on the ability adequately to measure each of the required data-
inputs. 
In addition to monitorability, the ability to verify depends on ‘assessability’. This mainly
depends on the formulation of the commitment: does it provide a standard against which a
party’s performance can be assessed? If the commitment is ambiguous, an assessment of a
state’s compliance would be difficult even if the information available on its performance
were perfect. Assessability also depends on the ability to analyse the information obtained
through monitoring, compare it with the commitment, and draw conclusions: some potential
verifiers will tend to lack these capacities.
The verifiability of a particular commitment will vary according to which actor would be
doing the verification  and which country or organisation is being verified. If the ability to
verify compliance is significant for the implementation and development of international
environmental agreements, the uneven distribution of such abilities amongst the actors
involved can be expected to be important.
Verifiability and the implementation of international environmental agreements 
The importance of verification issues, including verifiability,  will depend on factors such as 
the patterns of interests, costs  and benefits involved in an international environmental
agreement, and the stringency of commitments. The possible ways  in which the ability to
verify compliance could affect implementation can be divided into interest-based and
learning-based mechanisms and into mechanisms affecting the power and actions of states
and of domestic and non-state actors. 
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The verifiability of commitments could affect the ways states calculate and pursue their
interests. The extent to which states can (or believe they can) verify the compliance of  treaty
partners may affect their calculations of the costs and benefits of joining and implementing an
agreement, and their confidence in its fairness and effectiveness. The ability to monitor and
assess compliance could help to build mutual confidence. Furthermore, assessments by each
state on how well other parties  can verify its own performance could affect how it decides to
implement its commitments. The more probable it is that good performance will be
recognised and non-compliance will be exposed, the greater are the incentives to comply.
Where a country lacks the capacity to implement properly, assessments of  verifiability may
affect the extent to which its government  is prepared to admit difficulties and ask for
exemptions or assistance. Moreover, the ability to verify compliance, and the ways it is
distributed amongst parties, could affect power relations between states. Further, the ability of
states to find and efficiently implement complex mutually-beneficial agreements partly
depends on transparency, and thus on verifiability. So does the extent to which leaders can set
political or commercial standards that others follow.
Verifiability is a measure of the ease with which states can learn about their interests by
keeping abreast of the ways in which commitments are being implemented. It also relates to
the potential for states to learn from the treaty partners  implementation performance in a
timely and effective way. The ability of international organisations or other parties to monitor
relevant activities inside a state could be used to improve that state s capacity to implement its
commitments. Such monitoring resources could also help parties to understand the
environmental problems better.
Domestic and non-state actors are particularly important for the implementation of most
environmental agreements. Verifiability can affect the cost-benefit calculations the
government bureaucracies and domestic interest groups make about their interests in
implementation of an agreement. International organisations could be empowered as a result
of their monitoring or assessment capacity. Likewise, a state s ability to verify compliance
could empower it in relation to domestic actors. Moreover, the ability to verify could
empower particular government ministries, or change power relations between domestic
actors. 
The ability of non-state actors to expose poor compliance could strengthen them in their
dealings with the state and other domestic actors. Moreover, as verifiability issues become
salient, the states, organisations or experts who operate relevant existing monitoring systems
or data-bases, or who have privileged access to them, could also be empowered. Since the
ability to verify will depend partly on experts, they will be placed in a particular position of
influence when verification matters.
The transparency associated with verifiability can facilitate learning of all types of actors.
Moreover, international or independent monitoring, reporting  and assessment systems
associated with verifying a treaty provides governments, regulators, bureaucracies and non-
state actors with information they may not otherwise have had. This additional information
could help government agencies, regulators or companies to learn how to implement their
commitments more effectively. 
xWhere formal commitments are relatively unverifiable, a variety of informal indicators may
be used to monitor or assess performance. The choice of such indicators is likely to be a
political as well as a technical process and, since they may only be indirectly or loosely linked
to formal commitments, their use has the effect of changing the standards by which
compliance is assessed and thus shaping implementation. Notably, interested parties may use
different informal indicators, according to their interests and monitoring capacities. The
development and use of such indicators could increase the connections between international
commitments and domestic implementation or international assistance programmes. The
development and significance of such relatively verifiable informal indicators of performance
is an important area for further research. 
Verifiability and the formulation and negotiation of commitments
If verifiability issues could be important to implementation and to the power and learning of 
interested parties, then they are likely to be taken into account when commitments are being
formulated or negotiated, and when decisions are being made about whether to join an
agreement. 
Perceptions of the potential verifiability of commitments in a given issue area could affect
decisions about whether to try to negotiate agreements. Assessments of the relative
verifiability of possible commitments could shape the formulation of agreements. Since the
distribution of abilities to verify could affect power and interests (of both states and non-
state actors), assessments of verifiability could affect parties  negotiating strategies. Some
governments may be unwilling to negotiate or join environmental agreements unless they
believe the commitments are at least potentially verifiable. The design of  an agreement,
including the establishment of transparency or reporting rules and implementation review and
monitoring systems, could be affected by a desire to make compliance more verifiable. The
extent to which verifiability concerns have shaped the initiation, development, and design of
environmental regimes, and participation in them,  needs further research. 
Verifiability and the development of  environmental regimes
Environmental regimes are dynamic, and their development continues after initial
commitments have been agreed. Verifiability could also be significant in shaping the further
development of both the commitments and the institutions of the regime.
Where existing commitments are deemed inadequately (or excessively) verifiable by at least
some interested parties, or where the ability to verify compliance brings problems to light, it
may generate pressures to reformulate existing commitments or negotiate new ones.  It may
also lead to the adoption of a variety of informal verifiable indicators of performance, as
discussed above. This can amount to an informal development of commitments, since such
indicators can effectively change the standards by which parties  compliance is assessed.
Verifiability is also an important factor in the effectiveness of unilateral confidence-building
measures or pledge and review  processes, which are important for many environmental
regimes and particularly for framework conventions. 
Verifiability issues may similarly affect the institutional development of environmental
regimes Measures to improve independent monitoring facilities may strengthen or shape
international organisations, implementation review procedures, or transparency rules
associated with an agreement. Alternatively, if compliance with commitments is relatively
xi
transparent, the demand for implementation review procedures and international monitoring
or assessment facilities will be reduced. The development of  clusters of informal indicators of
performance could generate demand for highly developed implementation review
mechanisms. The relationship between the verifiability of commitments and the development
of implementation review mechanisms is worthy of further research. So are questions relating
to developing and regulating the shared use of  monitoring facilities, including environmental
monitoring satellites, for verifying several conventions.
Changes in verifiability and regime dynamics
The verifiability of a given environmental commitment is likely to change over time. This
may be done deliberately, but verifiability will  also change as a result of relatively
independent processes. Changes in intrinsic monitorability, due to scientific, technical or
social developments, can be expected, as can changes in monitoring infrastructures  and the
political or economic systems of the states involved. Because verifiability affects interests,
power and learning processes, these relatively autonomous changes could affect the
implementation and development of environmental regimes. 
Moreover, answers to the question how much verifiability is enough  not only varies between
interested parties, but also over time. If  assessments change on whether existing
commitments are adequately verifiable, there is normally scope for achieving substantial
improvements in parties  verification abilities,  either unilaterally or multilaterally. However,
such changes in standards  could also  lead to demands for changes in regime rules and
commitments.
Conclusions
Improved awareness of the character and determinants of verifiability and of its potential
significance would inform research on  the implementation and development of international
environmental agreements in potentially important ways. A number of issues that are
particularly worthy of research include: 
- the extent to which verifiability has affected the formulation of environmental commitments
and participation in them; 
- the determinants and characteristics of  monitorability, especially of the intrinsic
monitorability of activities or substances covered by commitments; 
- the relationship between verifiability and the development and effectiveness of review
mechanisms;
- the  role and development of relatively-verifiable informal indicators of  national
performance in regime implementation and development;
- the relationship between changes in verifiability and regime development and
implementation;
- the development and management of, and regulation of access to,  environmental monitoring
facilities (such as satellites) which are important to the verifiability of several international
environmental conventions.
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ON VERIFIABILITY,  AND HOW IT COULD MATTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
August 1994 (revised  Nov 1994)
Owen Greene*  
1. INTRODUCTION
Verification issues are potentially important in all international agreements where the policies
and actions relevant to the agreement of some or all of the participants depend to some extent
on the behaviour of other members. More specifically, verification issues are potentially
significant when the benefits of participating in an agreement depend to some extent on the
compliance of other members with its main rules and commitments. Processes by which
performance can be monitored and reviewed can affect behaviour and shape the development
of agreements. In some cases, perceptions of verifiability of an agreement could affect the
extent to which states are willing to participate in an agreement at all.
Processes for verifying how well partners are complying with their treaty obligations may
even be important for states that could benefit from implementing their commitments
irrespective of other parties’ performance. States may decline such benefits if they suspect
that partners think that they can take them for a ride, in order to avoid setting undesirable
precedents for future agreements or to encourage (potential or actual) treaty partners to
change their general approach towards compliance. Moreover, domestic politics being what it
is, uncertainties about compliance can be used by domestic interest groups opposed to the
agreement or some of its obligations to block implementation. 
Effective verification processes can have an important confidence-building role, encouraging
broader participation and further regime development. By contributing to timely information-
exchange between the parties, verification and review processes could help countries to
optimise the effectiveness of their collective action.  They can deter non-compliance and thus
*
 Owen Greene is a Principle Investigator in the Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Agreements project at IIASA, and also Senior Lecturer, International Relations and
Security Studies, at the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK.
Acknowledgments
The stimulus for me to write this paper came from an early meeting of the researchers and advisors for
the IIASA project on implementation and effectiveness of international environmental agreements. 
There it was suggested that a ’thinkpiece’  exploring the determinants and potential significance of  the
verifiability of environmental commitments would usefully complement and develop our work on the
role of  verification and implementation review processes, and aim to identify areas for further
research. An initial outline was developed after  discussions with David Victor, and subsequently John
Lanchbery, Juan Carlos di Primio, David Victor and Gene Skolnikoff provided valuable suggestions
and comments on a draft paper.  I gratefully acknowledge their help.
2encourage parties to implement their commitments properly and to report accurate
information. Effective verification processes would bring evidence of non-compliance to the
attention of members of an agreement in a timely way, enabling them to act to help with
capacity problems impeding implementation, to protect their interests, or to take appropriate
measures to persuade or enable laggards or poor performers to change their ways and
implement their commitments more fully  in the future. 
By improving transparency, verification processes can shape on-going assessments by the
parties and other relevant actors of their interests and the ways they choose to pursue these. In
addition to providing information about compliance, they can promote learning about: the
environmental problems themselves; the problems, constraints and opportunities confronting
regime partners; and the effectiveness of different implementation measures. 
Moreover, increased transparency can increase the capacity of  environmental groups and
other non-state actors to play an effective role in improving national environemtnal
performance (both at home and abroad) and promoting regime development, by  directly or
indirectly influencing government policies or by changing the behaviour of  other non-
state actors. Transparency may bring new actors into the fray, as people and organisations
become aware of  the significance of the regime for them and of their interests in its
development and implementation. Further, to the extent that non-state actors (non-
governmental organisations, international organisations, expert groups and such like) acquire
some standing  in the verification process, their capacity to shape the development of other
aspects of the regime may be enhanced.
This is not to suggest that verification, implementation review or transparency processes
necessarily help to promote formation, development and effectiveness of international
environmental agreements. On the contrary, it is possible to identify a variety of
circumstances in which they could be damaging. For example, some countries may be
unwilling to join an agreement if verification and implementation review issues are prominent
during the negotiation phase or if the agreement contains what they believe to be unduly
intrusive or expensive provisions for monitoring their performance. Concerns about
verifiability may shape commitments in ways that limit the potential for the agreement to
achieve its main goals. Similarly, some transparency or implementation review processes
could empower groups that are opposed to the agreement or undermine its supporters.  Some
verification systems could raise undue suspicion about compliance, or make it difficult to
resolve implementation problems in the most effective ways. 
Nevertheless, for better or worse, verification and implementation review issues could be a
major factor in the initiation, negotiation, establishment and development of international
environmental agreements, and in determining their effectiveness. Their important role in
arms control and disarmament agreements is well-known and relatively well-studied1. To an
extent, their role in agreements in other issue areas such as trade (e.g., GATT) and human
1
 There is a large literature on verification in the arms control and disarmament context. See for
example, articles and references in the annual VERTIC yearbook - most recently J Poole and R.
Guthrie (eds) Verification Report 1994: Yearbook on Peacekeeping, Arms Control and Environmental
Agreements, Brassey’s, London, 1994 - and S.Sur (ed), Verification of Current Disarmament and Arms
Limitation Agreements: ways , means, and practices, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Aldershot, 1991.
3rights has also been studied. However, their role in international environmental agreements
has until recently been the subject of relatively little research2. 
It is an important part of the aims of  the IEC project on the implementation and effectiveness
of international environmental agreements to correct this, and to develop understanding of 
the role and significance of verification and implementation review issues for international
environmental agreements.  This paper aims to explore  an aspect of this issue: the potential
significance of ‘verifiability’ in the development and effectiveness of environmental regimes.
Thus,  it aims to provide an initial discussion of  verifiability - what it is, and how it could
matter - and to identify some potentially important areas for future research. 
Verifiability is the ability to verify. Thus this thinkpiece only discusses one aspect of  the
relationship between verification issues and environmental agreements. Clearly the
significance of  actually  establishing and using verification and implementation review
systems is a larger and potentially more important question.  This broader  question has been
initially examined elsewhere (Fischer (1991); Ausubel and Victor (1992); Greene (1993)),
providing at least a starting point for further research within the IIASA project and elsewhere.
In contrast the potential significance, and even the characteristics, of verifiability in this
context have not yet been properly  addressed, thus motivating this initial review.
The next section discusses  the potential ways in which verifiability may relate to the
development and effectiveness of  environmental agreements. This is followed by an
examination of the characteristics and determinants of verifiability. The next section after that
outlines the ways in which changes in verifiability may relate to the dynamics of regime
development and implementation. Throughout each section, the aim has been to identify
potential areas for further research as they arise in the discussion. Nevertheless, some of the
main research issues raised are outlined in the concluding section.
Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by some of the
key terms used in this paper. 
Verification is the process of assessing compliance with the commitments in an agreement, or
of comparing national performance with agreed standards. The verification process includes
monitoring and assessment. More specifically, it includes: monitoring, data-collection and
information exchange; analysis of the information gathered or generated; and on the basis of
this analysis, assessments of compliance or performance in relation to commitments. It is
carried out by parties or groups other than the party whose performance is being assessed,
implying some degree of independence from this party in the monitoring, auditing or
assessment processes involved.  
For our purposes, verification is not simply about whether or not a party is in compliance, but
also with the extent to which it is complying with commitments.  
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  There has, however,  been a growing literature on this recently, much of it by researchers involved in
Module 3 of IIASA’s IEC project and their close collaborators, and a significant part  relating to
climate change.  See the following references for initial examinations of verification issues and
environmental agreements : W. Fischer (1991); Ausubel & Victor (1992), Greene (1993); and also  J.
Poole & R. Guthrie (1992, 1993, 1994).
4Verifiability is the ability to verify; that is, the extent to which commitments in an agreement
are amenable to effective verification. It is a combination of  monitorability - the capacity to
measure or monitor the activities or substances covered by a commitment - and assessability
(the ability to compare monitored performance with a commitment). 
The determinants and characteristics of monitorability and assessability are examined further
in section 3, where the question of what we mean by verifiability is also explored in more
detail. However, we begin by discussing the mechanisms by which verifiability may affect the
development or effectiveness of international environmental agreements. 
   
2. HOW COULD VERIFIABILITY RELATE TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS?
2.1 Introduction
The definition of effectiveness of environmental agreements is itself contested (see, for
example, Young, (1992, 1994); Levy (1993); Haas et al (1993)). The extent to which an
international agreement works well can be assessed according to a number of criteria -
whether:  it helps to tackle  the environmental problems it was established to solve;  its goals
are actually achieved;  it changes behaviour of actors along the lines of  its agreed standards
or commitments;  its provisions are adopted in domestic law; it is efficient, fair, sustainable or
robust. In this section, we mostly adopt a behavioural understanding of effectiveness (asking
how the verifiability of international commitments could affect behaviour relating to the
implementation or development of such commitments). But not exclusively so: we also
consider mechanisms by which verifiability may relate to other dimensions of effectiveness
listed above. 
Verifiability is a necessary condition for effective verification processes, which in turn are
closely related to (or overlap with) implementation review mechanisms. Therefore, many of
the ways in which verifiability could relate to regime development and effectiveness are
bound to be closely associated with the mechanisms by which verification and
implementation review could be important, which are discussed  in Victor et al (1994) and in
Fischer (1991), Ausubel and Victor (1992) and Greene (1993). The following discussion aims
to build on this understanding (or, at least, mapping) of the potential roles of implementation
review and verification, to identify the particular roles that verifiability issues might play. 
There are some issues or themes that are important throughout the subsequent discussion. One
relates to the fact that  verifiability is the  ability to verify rather than the actual use or results
of verification processes. This means that perceptions or calculations of verifiability will tend
to be particularly relevant. Beliefs about the ability to verify will depend upon understandings
about monitoring or assessment capacity, and these could turn out to be mistaken. 
Moreover, assessments of verifiability will depend on assumptions about the additional
resources that would be  available actually to carry out verification, or about the  economic,
political or social costs that might be acceptable. The additional resources available are likely
to be limited, and different participants may make different assumptions about negotiable  or
acceptable additional costs for verification purposes. 
5In this context, verifiability depends partly on the existence of  broader monitoring systems
and infrastructures, and  of  relevant transparency and consultation processes, which will
provide a basis on which verification systems could be built. Transparency processes are thus
related to verifiability. 
Such existing monitoring infrastructures and transparency processes will have their own
characteristics, and will vary from country to country. Combined with the fact that different
actors will typically have differing access to resources and expertise, this implies that the
ability to verify will be unevenly distributed amongst the actors involved.  This distribution
can be expected to have some stable or structural characteristics: some states’ environmental
performance is more transparent than others’ across a range of  issue areas, and some actors
have a relatively great overall capacity for environmental monitoring and assessment.
Nevertheless, the distribution of capacity to verify is bound to depend in detail on the precise
commitments involved.
The verifiability of a particular commitment will thus vary according to who would be doing
the verification and which country or other actor is being  verified. To the extent that
verifiability is important, one would expect that such differences between actors’ ability to
verify the same commitment could be significant in the development, implementation and
effectiveness of regime commitments. 
In discussing the ways in which  verifiability issues may relate to the effectiveness and
implementation of environmental agreements, it is possible to distinguish between  two broad
levels of analysis. First, there are possible mechanisms by which verifiability issues could
affect how ‘unitary’ states interact, which policies such states choose to adopt, and how they
implement them. Second, there are ways in which verifiability could affect domestic or non-
state policies or processes in ways that could impact on the development, implementation and
effectiveness of  environmental commitments. 
In each case, verifiability may relate to: actors’ assessments of their interests and of the best
way to pursue these; the potential for effective and sustained cooperation; learning processes;
capacity-building processes; and the ability to affect the policies and implementation practices
of other actors. The following sections aim to outline each type of  mechanism in turn,
beginning with the policies and interactions of unitary states. Potential areas for further
research are indicated as they arise.
2.2 Verifiability, interstate interactions, and effectiveness of  international
environmental commitments
2.2.1 The assessment and pursuit by unitary states of  their  interests
Potential mechanisms linking verification processes and effectiveness: 
Verification and implementation review processes can affect the development,
implementation and effectiveness of  international agreements through their effects on the
ways in which states calculate their interests and choose policies to pursue these interests. The
main mechanisms by which they may do this is: (i) to make the extent to which each party is
complying with its commitments more transparent to treaty partners and to others, and (ii) to
provide a framework within which regular assessments can take place, political pressures for
6improved performance can be exerted, and responses to non-compliance can be formulated
and coordinated. 
By increasing the risks of exposure, potential ‘laggards’ or free-riders  may be encouraged to
comply with agreed commitments. To the extent that other states’ believe that the benefits of 
participating in an agreement depend on the compliance of  other members,  verification and
implementation review systems can provide information and re-assurance that
implementation is in their interests, and thus help to maintain and build confidence in the
regime.
By increasing transparency, verification systems may help parties to identify and sustain
complex bargains that allow all parties to benefit. In principle, they could have this effect
whether the parties were primarily concerned about their ‘absolute’ costs and benefits or
about their relative positions compared with their competitors. In the latter case, verification
and implementation review processes can at least re-assure each party that it is not losing out
unacceptably.  
How important these interest-based mechanisms are for the development and effectiveness of
a given agreement depends on the underlying patterns of  power and interests involved (the
‘strategic’ situation, or ‘game’). Classically, one would most expect verification to be
important where states perceive themselves to be in a ‘collaboration game’, where the benefits
of complying with commitments depends upon the compliance of other states, and where
there are incentives for some states to cheat (see, for example, Stein (1990)). 
However, it is possible to envisage a range of other types of  ‘games’ where transparency  of 
national compliance and performance could help or hinder states in finding and maintaining
effective environmental agreements. Parties that, even without an agreement, would have
independently planned to implement policies consistent with their commitments cannot be
expected to be greatly affected in their domestic implementation policies by the existence of
verification systems. However, they could be encouraged to ‘over comply’ if they receive
information confirming that other parties are meeting their commitments. Moreover, where
the benefits to them are increased by widespread compliance, such ‘leading’ states may
nevertheless want verification  systems, to use them  to exert pressure on more reluctant states
to comply.
The actual importance of these mechanisms can also  be expected to vary according to the
stringency of the commitments.  Whatever the underlying patterns of interests and incentives
(or ‘game structure’), verification issues may have little salience  if the potential costs and
benefits of non-compliance are small. Moreover, interest in verifying the performance of
treaty partners can be expected to be relatively low if it seems clear that most of them do not
find their commitments to be stringent and will find it easy to comply, since verification
would probably have little impact on their behaviour in such circumstances.
 
The importance of these mechanisms by which verification could affect  behaviour  also
depends  on the willingness of parties to use them. For example,  in some cases, parties may
be quite inclined to establish and use verification systems to monitor a particular state’s
performance and to pressure it to comply fully, even if  they suspect that this may only have a
marginal impact on its behaviour or if  its performance in meeting its commitments barely
directly affects their interests in the agreement. The same parties may prefer to turn a blind
7eye to the inadequacies of another states’ performance. This may be because they are more
worried about the possibility that it might leave the agreement or retaliate if challenged, or
because of  broader considerations of power and foreign policy. 
Verifiability of commitments, by definition, is a necessary condition for effective verification
processes. Thus the extent to which states have an ability to verify commitments will be a
major factor in determining the extent to which any of the mechanisms outlined above may
operate. 
Moreover, the particular characteristics and distribution of  verification capacities in a specific
issue area may have qualitative effects on the ways in which such mechanisms operate and on
their effects. Some commitments are more verifiable than others and, for each commitment,
abilities to verify will be unevenly distributed amongst states. Variations in verification
abilities may thus shape states’ calculations of interests as they decide how to operate within
an agreement and how to implement their commitments.
Verifiability and the shaping and negotiation of commitments
 In the ‘rational actor’ paradigm we are temporarily adopting here,  if  the mechanisms
relating verification processes to effectiveness outlined above are likely to be important in a
given agreement,  our  ‘unitary’ states can be expected to take them into account when they
are considering whether to enter into such an agreement, and when they negotiate
commitments. At this stage in the development of an agreement, assessments by states of their
potential abilities to verify would be relevant rather than the verification process itself.
Thus,  understandings about verifiability  may be an important factor in decisions about
whether to join an agreement and about the formulation and implementation of commitments.
States which calculate that participation or implementation is only in their interest if others
also comply may be unwilling to enter into negotiations where potential commitments appear
unverifiable. Conversely, states seeking merely symbolic agreements may not want to risk
being manoeuvred into verifiable agreements. 
For similar reasons, concerns about verifiability may shape commitments, and thus the overall
design of the international regime. For example, the Montreal protocol is primarily concerned
with limiting concentrations of chlorine and bromine in the stratosphere, and thus with
limiting emissions of ozone depleting substances such as CFCs. However, commitments
focus on  consumption (defined as production plus imports minus exports), partly because this
is more monitorable (it is also more amenable to effective government regulation). 
Governments which believe that they can use verification systems to promote their interests
will tend to try to shape commitments accordingly, to ensure that they, at least, are able to
monitor and assess performance.  Moreover, it is possible to conceive of situations where
states will want to negotiate verifiable agreements which nevertheless lack effective
verification systems. They may believe that their interests are best served by an agreement in
which non-compliance cannot easily be detected at the beginning of the regime, with the
option of being able to develop effective verification systems later.  They may, for example,
want to defer full compliance themselves. Alternatively, they may believe that this is the only
way to win broad agreement to sign up to a desirable agreement, and hope to improve its
effectiveness later. These states will have an interest in shaping commitments so that they are
"verifiable"  but deferring the establishment of effective verification procedures. 
8A variant of this approach would be negotiate commitments so that one aspect of verifiability
was in place, but not the other. For example, commitments could relate to monitorable
activities, but be formulated ambiguously so that compliance cannot be objectively assessed.
States could then, for example,  hope to be able relatively rapidly to refine the commitments
or standards to make them more specific when the time was judged to be right.
The extent to which assessments of verifiability have actually shaped the negotiation or
formulation of  international environmental commitments, or affected decisions about
whether to participate in an agreement, is unclear and a potentially important subject for
empirical research. From the foregoing discussion, one would expect the salience of 
verifiability to depend upon: perceptions of the patterns of interests or pay-offs  that an
agreement would involve (i.e. the strategic situation or game  states perceived themselves to
be in); the extent to which states were concerned with relative advantage rather than
absolute  cost-benefit calculations; the stringency of commitments; and the extent to which
there were significant differences in the verifiability of  the types of negotiable commitments.
In cases where  verifiability issues seem to have been salient, a number of ways in which
states may aim to affect verifiability in pursuance of their interests were indicated above (such
as varying the specificity of  commitments), and it would be interesting and potentially
important to trace which of these were used and with what effect.   
Efficiency of joint effort
In our review of the role of  implementation review mechanisms (IRMs) may play in the
effectiveness of  international environmental agreements (Victor et al, 1994), an interest-
based process is identified by which IRMs can, through information gathering and exchange, 
reduce the transaction costs of finding and maintaining international agreements which states
enter into in order to benefit from efficiencies gained by performing some functions jointly. 
In this context, the verifiability of activities or phenomena in a given issue area could directly
correlate with the prospects that states will achieve such joint actions. To the extent that
relevant activities are relatively easily or reliably monitorable, it may be easier for
governments to identify opportunities for cooperation and to establish efficient common
standards. 
The correlation between verifiability and transparency is potentially important here. If the
relevant activities and concerns of each potential partner are relatively transparent to the
others, governments are more likely to be able to identify and negotiate such cooperative
agreements. Once joint action is agreed, transparency will make it easier to maintain and
develop the cooperation. 
Moreover, the partners may decide to establish implementation review mechanisms (IRMs) or
improve their monitoring capabilities to increase the efficiency of their cooperation, and
thereby improve verifiability as a side benefit. However, to the extent that the relevant
activities are already adequately verifiable (or transparent) using national means or existing
information exchange systems, there may be less demand to establish new IRMs. This
indicates one of many ways in which verifiability could shape the demand for, and design of,
IRMs in an agreement.
Within an established international regime, there may also be many situations where some or
all parties could benefit from performing some functions jointly and where verifiability may
be relevant. For example, groups of parties may be able to benefit by jointly implementing
policies to meet commitments, or by acting jointly to persuade or enable poor performers to
9improve their compliance. They could similarly benefit  by jointly funding improvements in
monitoring capacity,  or joint-development of  new technologies to facilitate improvements in
environmental performance. 
Where such cooperation is explicitly provided for in the established regime, IRMs may have
been established to improve transparency and facilitate joint action. However, more generally,
the transparency associated with verifiability may be useful for finding and maintaining such
cooperation. One possible example relates to joint action to pressure a state to improve its
compliance or performance. Since verifiability is the ability to monitor and assess other
parties  performance and compliance, it is an important factor in the capacity of groups of
states effectively to generate and target pressures for improved compliance or even joint
enforcement actions.
The distribution of  verification capacity is potentially important in this context. States with a
relatively good capacity to monitor or assess other states  activities or performance will be in
a better position to set agendas for joint action than states with relatively little ability to
monitor or assess. Such states may thus be better able to identify and pursue its interests
through these joint actions.  
Empowerment of states
Verifiability may thus relate to the capacity of states to influence or coerce others. The
capacity to expose non-implementation of commitments can be used not only in the interests
of the regime itself but as an instrument wider foreign policy objectives. There will be
differences between states  monitoring and assessment capacities, due to differences in their
technical monitoring capacities and expert resources, and to differences in the nature of the
states themselves (some are more transparent than others, etc.).  Such differences in states
capacities to identify and expose non-compliance in others will affect distributions of power
and influence. Moreover, influence may not only derive from a capacity to expose poor
performance:  the ability to monitor and assess the activities of other states may provide many
opportunities to exert political or economic influence or advantage. 
In principle, perceptions of a state s ability to verify could sometimes be as important as its
actual ability. If others believe that a state has a capacity to identify poor performance, this
could in itself deter non-compliance. Moreover, claims made by such a state about the
performance of others would be likely to gain serious attention, even if they are not well-
founded. However, the potential for  exploiting such a reputation is probably more limited in
the environmental issue area than for example in arms control or counter-terrorism:
environmental monitoring capacity is not classified, and there would be little excuse for not
sharing evidence fully with others. 
The design of  monitoring and assessment systems associated with the agreement can affect
the ways such capacities may be distributed. International organisations and international
monitoring systems tend to empower relatively poor or weak states in this context. But this is
not necessarily always the case and would need to be investigated for each regime.
Empowerment of International Organisations
The resources and influence of international organisations themselves may also be affected by
their ability to monitor or assess activities or materials covered by  environmental
commitments. Existing international organisations with relevant expertise or  responsibilities
may be able to extend their role and influence by providing monitoring or verification
services to the parties of a new environmental agreement. For example, the FAO has
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apparently been keen to play a role in emerging environmental conventions relating to land
use, where it has established monitoring and data-collection experience (though so far seems
to have had only limited success in securing such roles). Similarly, the Secretariat or
international bodies of experts specifically associated with an agreement may  increase their
resources and influence if they gain the ability (that is, both the capacity and the remit) to
monitor or assess parties  performance in relation to their commitments. 
2.2.2 Verifiability, learning and states  behaviour
Learning about interests
Verification systems are primarily designed to help states keep abreast of their changing
interests, as they are affected by the performance of other states in meeting their
commitments. Verifiability is a measure of the ease and reliability with which such learning
processes take place. More broadly, if key activities are relatively monitorable, relevant
information will tend to be easier to collect and be more persuasive to decision makers. 
If states learn more about their interests, it will not necessarily lead to more effective
agreements. For example, measurability may make it easier for governments to agree
impressive sounding targets (and thus reduce pressures for further action), confident in the
knowledge that the targets can actually be achieved with little cost or change in policy. In this
context, "verifiability by whom?" is a potentially  important question. Activities that may be
easily measurable by some governments may not be so measurable by others, or by non-
state actors. Asymmetries in learning about interests may affect the negotiation and
implementation of agreements in a variety of ways, as discussed above. 
Confidence-building between states
An effective verification system can play an important confidence-building role, in that it can
help to reassure states that treaty partners are implementing their commitments. In part, this is
simply a question of helping states to learn about their interests, and is a consequence of the
confidence arising from parties being able to detect poor compliance in time to allow actions
to be taken to protect their interests. However, in this confidence-building role, the knowledge
gained through verification processes can also help to shape broader perceptions of the
trustworthiness of states as future cooperation partners in this and other regimes. Verifiability
will shape the effectiveness and character of these verification systems and thus overall
confidence-building processes.
Moreover,  the ability to monitor and assess of the activities of other states will provide
governments with opportunities to learn about the constraints under which their treaty
partners are operating. As governments become more aware of the efforts other states are
making to meet their commitments, and the obstacles they have to overcome to achieve them,
reactions to evidence of non-compliance are likely to become more sophisticated and less
prone to undue suspicions of bad faith. With more knowledge, they may be more able to
target assistance or political pressure more effectively to improve performance. Once again, 
even in this context increased knowledge will not always increase mutual confidence. It may
help other states to see through superficially impressive government programmes, or to
appreciate that seemingly stringent commitments were actually relatively painless for some
states. 
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Verifiability could also be an important factor in determining the effectiveness of unilateral
actions in stimulating positive international responses, and perhaps initiating international
cooperation. The international impact of unilateral commitments may often depend on their
verifiability. An unverifiable commitment may generate cynicism and resentment rather than
confidence: since they cannot monitor whether it is being implemented, other states may
suspect the declaration to be purely symbolic and designed to secure domestic or international
political advantage. 
Often, such suspicions may be justified. However, it may also be that governments had acted
in good faith, but had neglected to design their commitment so that it is verifiable by others.
Thus, assessments of  the verifiability of  one’s own country’s actions may be important in
shaping unilateral commitments.
Moreover, unilateral measures aimed at increasing the verifiability of relevant activities
within their state may be one of the most effective types of  unilateral confidence-building
measures. Unilateral initiatives to provide information or increase transparency can be most
effective in building confidence when they substantially improve verifiability in areas of
greatest concern to cooperation partners. 
Designing such unilateral confidence-building measures effectively could therefore require a
government to have a relatively sophisticated appreciation of the significance of verifiability
for the effectiveness of the agreement and of  the gaps in key treaty partners’ abilities to verify
its  performance. These gaps may  be in the areas where the government concerned has
relatively little problem in auditing its own progress in implementing its commitments. 
While  such unilateral transparency measures to improve verifiability can build mutual
confidence in an international environmental agreement that defines specific environmental
commitments for each party,  they can be much more important for ‘framework’ conventions
which define broad obligations but allow flexibility about how each party chooses to
implement them. The conventions and Agenda 21 process agreed at the 1992 Rio Conference
have some of these characteristics. For example, pending future protocols, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change  (FCCC) essentially establishes a ‘pledge and review’
process,  whereby parties (particularly developed countries) are required to pledge themselves
to unilaterally-defined policies and targets for limiting greenhouse gas emissions  and  to
provide reports allowing their plans and progress in limiting emissions to be reviewed by their
treaty partners 3. The effectiveness of the FCCC in changing parties’ greenhouse gas
emissions will depend greatly on the effectiveness with which their performance can be
3 Proposals to establish a ’pledge and review’ process were much debated during the process of
negotiating the FCCC and where opposed by many states as an attempt to legitimise a lack of  specific
commitments such as emissions targets. Therefore, no reference is made to ’pledge and review’ in the
convention, although  its main obligations amount to a requirement for parties (particularly developed
countries) unilaterally to declare policies and commitments to limit their greenhouse gas emissions and
to provide reports to allow their performance to be reviewed. For a discussion of pledge and review in
the context of the FCCC, see M. Grubb and N. Steen (eds), (1991); and also  Chayes (1991); D. Victor
(1991).
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reviewed and thus partly on the verifiability of their pledges and the transparency of their
performance (Greene and Salt (1993); Victor and Salt (1994)).  
National Capacity
The verifiability of activities under a state s jurisdiction may nevertheless often  be a measure
of its national capacity to monitor its own activities and to implement environmental policies.
As discussed in section 3 below, the verifiability of activities within a state will often depend
on the existence of the national infrastructure and resources on which monitoring or
measurement can be based, and in a broader sense on the character and development of the
state and society concerned. In many environmental agreements, much of the information on
which assessments of national performance can be based will be collected by the government
concerned, or by associated national agencies or regional authorities. Thus, the extent to
which a government  can itself monitor relevant activities inside its own state is probably
frequently correlated with its capacity to regulate activities under its nominal jurisdiction, and
thus to implement policies designed to ensure compliance with treaty commitments.
Commitments made by weak or less developed states will thus often be much less verifiable
than similar commitments made by strong developed states.
If verification systems and implementation review mechanisms (IRMs) involve the
identification or establishment of new sources of data and analysis, at least as far as the state
involved with implementation is concerned, then they could increase national capacity to
comply with commitments. IRMs and verification systems may also alert other states and
international organisations about the need to provide assistance and also contribute to the
effective targeting of that assistance. Inadequate reporting by developing states in the
Montreal Protocol, for example, helped to reinforce and shape the case for assistance in
capacity-building under the multilateral fund.
Learning about the problem
Verifiability relates to commitments rather than to problems per se. However, to the extent
that these are linked, the measurability of activities relevant to the problem can obviously
affect learning. It is also possible that systems established to improve the capacity to verify
compliance will also provide  resources for additional monitoring, data-collection and
analysis that contributes to understanding of the problem itself (as well as to other
unconnected issues of potential importance). Awareness of this possibility may in turn make
agreements seem more verifiable. This is because governments and scientific funding
agencies are more likely to be persuaded to invest in new monitoring and analysis capacity if
this capacity can also be  used to learn about the environmental problems themselves.
However, where verifiability concerns shape commitments and choices about indicators of
national environmental performance, they could also affect the development of
understandings of the environmental problems themselves. The relationship between
environmental problems, environmental indicators, and indicators of national environmental
performance is frequently complex and confused (see for example, Noss et al (1992). In most
environmental issue areas, there is substantial scientific uncertainty and policy debate about
what the environmental ‘problems’ really are. The processes by which such problems are
defined for the purposes of  prioritising research and focusing policy-debates can be murky.
The same can be said about the ways in which certain activities or environmental indicators
become singled out for special attention.  In principle, research and attention given to
activities or indicators of national performance in order to improve verifiability could in
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practice affect choices about which environmental indicators to monitor for information on
the problems themselves. 
Environmental research and verifiability
In practice, resources are more likely to be invested in environmental monitoring and
assessment facilities that are designed to improve knowledge of  environmental  problems,
with spin-off advantages for verifiability, than the other way around. Much of the capacity
available to monitor environmental activities for verification purposes has been established
for the purposes of  scientific research, resource mapping, and environmental management.
The Landsat and SPOT satellite remote sensing systems provide examples of this,  and such
satellite-based environmental monitoring systems are due to be expanded greatly in the near
future with the development , for instance, of the Earth Observation satellite system. Only
very recently has the potential role of such systems for verification purposes begun to
considered seriously (see, for example, Fischer et al, 1992). 
The extent to which environmental monitoring systems, including remote sensing facilities,
contribute to the verifiability of a wide range of  existing and potential international
environmental commitments is a potentially important area for scientific research. This does
not only raise questions relating to technical monitoring capabilities. For example, principles
and rules relating to access to such data for verification purposes are still at an early stage of
development, and yet are becoming important policy issues.
In this context, it is important to note that the monitoring capacities of  any one of such
systems are likely to be relevant to more than one environmental agreement. Thus a cluster of
conventions covering related issue areas could make use of the same monitoring systems.
For example, the climate change convention, biodiversity convention, desertification
convention and proposed forestry agreements all generate interest in the verifiability of 
commitments relating to land-use, as do a number of regional agreements.  The
implementation of  such commitments may be monitored using a range of  satellite and
aircraft- based remote sensing systems as well as established and emerging FAO data-
collection systems. The challenges of  efficiently and effectively organising the development
and use of such generic  monitoring facilities to improve the verifiability or effectiveness of 
a variety of  environmental  agreements with differing  requirements are substantial and
require research.
    
2.3 Verifiability, effectiveness and domestic or non-state processes
In this section, we stop pretending that states are the only major actors involved in making
and implementing international environmental agreements or that states are typically
‘unitary’. Non-state actors can also be important. The behaviour of powerful groups in and
around governments, and of  other transnational and domestic non-state actors, may be related
to the verifiability of commitments and to verification processes in general.
It can be misleading to assume that states are unitary in any issue area. The individuals,
groups and ministries in and around government  who assess or decide state interests will tend
to bring their own interests to bear in the decisions they make on the state’s behalf. Moreover,
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non-governmental or transnational organisations constrain or shape for formulation or
implementation of government decisions or commitments.
Nevertheless, the links between the development and implementation  of  international
commitments and domestic or non-state processes are likely to be more important and
complex for environmental agreements than in other issue areas such as arms control.
Defence and security policy-making and implementation, for example, is normally
unambiguously controlled by central government. Although powerful domestic interest
groups, including the military, will shape the formulation of government policy, once state
policy is made, the mechanisms by which governments can ensure that military activities
change in accord with it are typically well-developed and relatively direct.  In contrast, most
activities relevant to the implementation of environmental agreements are carried out by non-
state actors, semi-autonomous state industries or agencies, or local authorities. Governments
thus face a particularly complex task in successfully regulating or altering the actions of many
domestic or transnational actors in their jurisdiction. 
As in the previous subsection, we now briefly review the ways in which the ability to verify
implementation of commitments (and the distribution of  such abilities) could  affect the
behaviour and role of non-state actors in relation to the effectiveness of international
environmental agreements - examining first interest-based mechanisms and then learning
processes.
2.3.1 Verifiability, interests, and domestic actors
Cost-Benefit calculations and interest groups within states
As noted above, the domestic interest groups in (or closely associated with) governments who
assess or decide state interests will tend to bring their own interests to bear on the cost-
benefit calculations they make on the state’s behalf. Thus, just as verification systems and
verifiability could affect the cost-benefit analyses of the state per se (which is an abstraction),
they can affect the calculations that these decision-makers make about their own interests and
the decisions they make for the state. Since it is these groups that negotiate or otherwise
determine the agreements, commitments and implementation policies  of their state, this effect
is potentially at least as important as the classical mechanisms outlined in section 2.2.1. 
Awareness of the verifiability  of the activities or materials in which they have a particular
interest or responsibility could thus affect the behaviour of particular groups, ministries or
government agencies. Some of the considerations and mechanisms would be similar to those
discussed in relation to states, in that these groups may make cost-benefit calculations about
the benefits of joining an international agreement in relation to the interest groups or types of
activities for which they are particularly responsible within the state, and negotiate
accordingly on the states behalf. In this context, even where verifiability issues may seem
marginal in relation to the states’ ‘overall’ interests, they could have important impacts on the
development or implementation of  environmental agreements because they are perceived to
be important for the particular interests of the government bureaucracies or groups that
represent the state in negotiations or have particular responsibility for implementation. 
  
Moreover, these interests in verifiability may  be influenced by domestic and well as
international considerations. For example, the development of  reporting rules or independent
monitoring capacity in association with an agreement may allow practices to be monitored
15
that could previously be kept secret from other branches of the government or society,  and
even from the President or Prime Minister. This may help other groups in the state learn about
their own interests. The prospect that such independent monitoring systems may be
established could certainly inform calculations of interests in an agreement by groups whose
activities might be exposed to government or societal as well as international scrutiny. Similar
issues may arise where an agreement would require or encourage a government itself to
establish effective national monitoring systems where none existed before. 
Similar considerations would apply to domestic interests that are influential but outside
government. The combined effects of verifiability on the way in which these groups negotiate
and define  government policy and the state s interests will depend on specific circumstances,
as will the significance for the negotiation and implementation of commitments. However,
this type of mechanism demonstrates that verifiability may affect the formulation and
character of a state s interests as well as the way it pursues them and the prospects for
effective agreements.  
Verifiability and relative empowerment within a state
The capacity to monitor and assess implementation of commitments could empower states in
relation to their own society, and may possibly empower various government bureaucracies,
and non-state actors such as international organisations, NGOs and non-governmental
experts. If  the verifiability of  implementation of commitments, or the distribution of  ability
to verify amongst different groups, affects the relative power and influence of  domestic or
transnational actors, one would expect it to have an effect on the formulation and
implementation of policy. 
In relation to the state s power in society,  international agreements may legitimate or
resource the development of  new or more effective national monitoring systems, potentially
enabling the state to monitor and regulate domestic activities more effectively. International
or independent monitoring  or reporting systems may expose activities of which the state was
previously unaware. Alternatively, they  may provide an opportunity for the state to gain
international support in its attempts to monitor or regulate activities nominally under its
jurisdiction to which it previously felt obliged  to turn a blind eye. 
To the extent that the state is trying to implement its commitments, these mechanisms  will
tend to increase treaty effectiveness, at least in the sense that behaviour would be changed in
line with the rules of the agreement. 
Furthermore, if the state has an ability to monitor implementation activities in other countries,
it may learn more effective ways to exert its influence within society or to control powerful
domestic interest groups.  However, this argument can work both ways. For some areas of
environmental policy, some non-state actors (such as concerned multinational companies,
international organisations, or well-organised environmental NGOs) may be better placed to
monitor implementation activities in other countries than the state itself.  
As discussed above, the ability to verify  may well empower certain government
bureaucracies. Information or resources for monitoring or assessment resources over which
they have control or access may gain new importance after an international environmental
agreement has been established or as verification concerns become salient, empowering
particular bureaucracies in relation to their rivals in and around government. Moreover, new
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verification or monitoring processes established in association with an international
agreement may change the relative power of government bureaucracies. An arms control
example of this is the Soviet foreign ministry officials who (much to the irritation of the
military officials present) found out about Soviet military programmes from US
representatives during discussions about verification during the SALT process). Such
processes may also give certain bureaucracies access to a range of international organisations
or experts with which they did not previously have contact.  
To the extent that governments care about the implementation of commitments by others, the
experts and bureaucracies charged with verification will gain additional means of influencing
government foreign policy.  Moreover, the knowledge they gain about other countries’
performance and also about the verification capacities themselves may enable them to
influence other dimensions of government policy making. They could shape decisions about 
how to implement domestic programmes, either because they have knowledge about the
experiences of other countries or because they know the limits of the capacity of other
countries to monitor their own country’s activities. Whether or not this will increase or
decrease the effectiveness of the agreement is uncertain.
The ability to verify will depend partly on experts, who are needed to carry out monitoring or
assessment, to develop or adapt new monitoring and assessment resources (including building
models or gathering data) and to provide expert advice. To the extent that governments and
other actors believe that verification issues are important, this will place experts in positions
of influence, both in relation to government assessments of other countries’ performance and
also in relation to domestic implementation. Technical or scientific experts tend to have an
independent professional concern to carry-out their allocated tasks in a scientifically or
technically competent way, and to extend their monitoring or assessment capacity where they
can (and potentially into areas that sections of  governments or other interest groups would
prefer to remain murky). 
To the extent to which such experts are part of a transnational scientific community, they tend
to act in accordance with the values of that community which may help to encourage them to
try to improve the effectiveness of international agreements and to try to improve domestic
implementation of commitments. In practice, there are often strong links between monitoring
and assessment relating to learning about environmental problems, reviewing the adequacy of
commitments, and monitoring parties’ performance in  meeting their existing commitments.
This will tend to further extend the ways in which experts’ role in verifiability could be used
to exert influence over policy: Concerns they have that arise from their ability to verify could
feed into the advice the scientific community gives about the nature of the problem and the
adequacy of  existing commitments.
The ability of  domestic or transnational non-state actors to verify compliance with treaty
commitments may empower them in their dealings with their own state authorities and other
relevant actors.  Their ability to expose inadequate implementation may be relatively
important in the effectiveness and development of agreements in the environment and human
rights areas. Not only are domestic groups and citizens often in a better position to monitor
some types of activities in their states than outsiders, but they may be relatively willing to
publicise the problems and cause embarrassment. Foreign governments, in contrast, may be
willing to turn a blind eye to inadequate compliance in the pursuit of broader interests or as
part of a tacit agreement amongst states to tolerate poor compliance. In other words,
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environmental groups and other non-state actors may not only accord a higher priority to the
effectiveness of environmental agreement than governments, but also insist upon
interpretations of  treaty requirements that involve higher (i.e. more stringent) standards.
Verifiability may help to empower them to pursue these objectives.  
To the extent that the ability of certain non-state actors to monitor or assess compliance or
implementation is recognised by parties, it may enhance their standing in the treaty regime
overall, empowering them in implementation review processes and in debates about refining
and developing commitments. 
Non-state actors may also be in a position to promote compliance more directly. In many
environmental agreements, governments  are only indirectly involved in implementation and
compliance. The capacity of non-state actors to monitor relevant activities by industry, exotic
pet traders, and such like, may directly encourage compliance with the standards set by the
international agreement, even without working through the state. 
Similarly, the ability of companies to monitor the activities of their rivals in their industry
may encourage compliance. If some firms are gaining competitive advantage through poor
environmental performance,  their rivals could have incentives to expose them. On the other
hand, this is an area where the distribution of abilities to verify could be critical. If 
government regulators, NGOs, or international organisations have little ability to monitor
their performance (or if ‘whistle-blowers’ in the industry are likely to be punished badly),
companies could tacitly agree to tolerate poor compliance with environmental regulations in
their industry.
Standard setting by leaders 
As with implementation review mechanisms in general, verifiability may increase the
effectiveness with which (political or commercial) leading groups or organisations can set
standards which are in tune with their own interests. Once standards are set, there is the
problem of encouraging their widespread adoption. The verifiability (or transparency) of 
activities or materials relevant to implementation may speed up the adoption of  ‘best
practice’ and ‘new’ technologies and such like. Those who stand to benefit from this may
discover an interest in a verifiable agreement. To the extent that the standards are useful to
promote implementation of the agreements, such mechanisms will tend to promote treaty
effectiveness. 
2.3.2 Verifiability, learning, and non-state actors  
Verifiability of commitments is correlated with the transparency of  the activities or
phenomena involved, and transparency can facilitate learning. Moreover, international or
independent monitoring and assessment systems associated with verifying a treaty may
provide governments, regulators, bureaucracies, and non-state actors with information that
they would not otherwise have had. National monitoring systems may be enhanced in order to
fulfill international reporting requirements, with similar results. 
To some extent, the implications of this for effectiveness have already been discussed in
relation to learning about interests and empowerment. However, simply learning the new
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information may improve effectiveness without changing power balances and interest
calculations. 
Governments and non-state actors will typically by uncertain about the effectiveness of the
measures they are taking. Information available as a result of verification capacity could
improve internal auditing and enable actors to implement their policies more effectively. 
Regulators and others responsible for implementation could learn from the performance of
their counterparts elsewhere: a particularly important process in relation to environmental
agreements where the task of shaping or regulating complex and decentralised social practices
is particularly challenging. It may also alert them to  unintended consequences of their actions
for compliance with agreements, so that they can take corrective action. 
The openness and timely availability  of the information gathered and used for verification
purposes will affect its value for such learning processes. Where compliance assessments are
to the fore, governments can be concerned to limit the availability of information. This can be
justified as a measure to prevent undue disputes and limit possible damage to the regime.
However, it also limits the extent to which the information is likely to be used to increase
effectiveness through learning and empowerment mechanisms. 
3. THE DETERMINANTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF  VERIFIABILITY
3.1 Introduction
The Verifiability of a commitment is the ability to verify it. As briefly outlined in section 1, it
is determined by a combination of two properties: the monitorability and assessability of the
implementation of  the commitment. The monitorability of a commitment is the ability to
measure or monitor the activities or substances covered by the commitment. Assessability is
the ability to assess compliance and performance by comparing monitored performance with
the commitment. 
Verification is carried out by organisations or states other than the state whose performance is
being assessed, and thus assessments of verifiability will partly depend on the extent to which
there is an ability to independently monitor or assess the performance of the state concerned.
Moreover, assessments of verifiability will also depend on judgments about how reliable a
verification process would have to be to be adequate  or effective ,  and this will depend
upon assessments of  interests, the strategic situation  (or game ), the stringency of the
commitments, and the main purposes which important actors hoped to achieve through the
verification system.  States and other interested actors have different characteristics,
capacities, and verification requirements,  and thus assessments of verifiability will depend on
the question verifiability by who, and of whom? .
In principle these are relatively straightforward concepts, and they have been sufficient to
allow a review in section 2 of the potential mechanisms by which verifiability may affect the
development and effectiveness of environmental agreements. It is now, however, necessary to
explore the determinants and characteristics of verifiability further, to provide a basis for
assessments of the verifiability of  particular commitments and refining possible research
questions relating to the significance of verifiability for environmental agreements. 
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The following subsections examine the main factors determining the monitorability and
assessability of commitments, bearing in mind the importance of the degree of independence
of the monitoring and assessments systems and which actors are involved.
3.2. Monitorability
 
Some types of  things or activities  are more amenable to reliable monitoring and
measurement than others.  This will depend upon a combination of a range of factors, which
can roughly divided into the following categories:  
- the intrinsic characteristics of the activities or phenomena to be monitored; 
- the characteristics of the monitoring, data-collection and assessment infrastructure available
to provide a basis on which specific monitoring can take place; 
- the characteristics of the states and societies being monitored. 
The possibility of monitoring other indicators as effective proxies for the activities or
phenomena to which the commitment applies is also a potentially very important
consideration. If the substance or activities specifically referred to in the commitments are
relatively unamenable to monitoring, it might still be possible to identify relatively
monitorable indicators to indirectly measure performance and compliance. 
We now examine each of these factors briefly in turn.
3.2.1 Intrinsic characteristics 
The intrinsic  monitorability of  materials or activities may relate to their physical or their
social or economic characteristics. Physically, the existence in a country of a large, fixed,
factory complex is nearly always more easily monitored than small, mobile or easily moved,
items. Everything else being equal, regular or permanent features or activities are easier to
monitor reliably than irregular or single events. Activities involving large numbers of
ordinary civilians or which impinge on many aspects of social and economic life are harder to
hide than relatively isolated activities that are carried out by the military or government
officials.
The extent to which a given material or activity is measurable will depend upon the level of
(natural or social) scientific and technical understanding, and on the extent to which relevant
monitoring devices are available or can be developed. This will depend upon past research
and investment in the area, and will change with time. For example, in the 1990s, changes in
atmospheric concentration of certain trace chemicals can be more accurately measured than
for other such chemicals. This is partly because of  laws of nature  and partly because of  the
(humanly-determined) state of science and the development of monitoring technologies.
One could imagine developing a lists of factors that determine the inherent measurability of
"Substance X" or "Activity Y". It is important to recognise, however, that these factors will be
social and economic as well as natural  or physical, and thus their significance (and even
their definition) will depend partly on social context. 
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Substance X  in this context could be a CFC,  toxic waste, oil tanker design, forest area, or
the Amazonian Red-Breasted Parrot. The factors determining its inherent monitorability could
include: size; vulnerability/destructibility; phase (gas, liquid, solid); mobility; chemical
reactiveness; reflective or absorptive properties; source; social or economic value; social
acceptability; uniqueness (or existence of "look alikes" or similar substances); and ease of
recognition by non-specialists( for example, could non-experts (such as local customs
officials) be reasonably expected to learn how to distinguish the protected Amazonian Red-
Breasted Parrot from the unprotected Columbian Ruby-Breasted Parakeet?). 
Activity Y could be, for example: Minke whaling;  lead battery disposal, or irrigation
practices. Factors determining monitorability could include: number of people involved; type
of people involved (civilians, military, scientists; astronauts; criminals); social or economic
value (to government, to particular commercial, social or ethnic groups); relationship to core
economic activities; social acceptability; public or private; social or individual; complexity;
dependence on large or permanent equipment or infrastructure; similarity to activities not
covered by commitment.
A possible area for further work would be to aim to develop such lists of  characteristics  into
a a generic list of the key physical and social factors determining the inherent monitorability
of ‘Substance X’ or "Activity Y’. Such a list could contribute to a clearer understanding of the
types of environmental  problems, activities or substances that were amenable to effective
regulation through international agreements where verification issues may be important. More
particularly, such work could inform  the formulation of commitments.  There are normally a
number of potential ways in which any given environmental problem could be addressed and,
to the extent that verifiability is potentially important for effectiveness, it would be desirable
to focus attention on negotiating types of commitments that are likely to prove amenable to
verification. This will often imply focusing on indirect methods of regulation and control,
where the activities or substances of direct concern are relatively unmonitorable: for example,
intentional oil pollution may be more effectively controlled by focusing on implementation of 
regulations relating to tanker design (designed to reduce the incentives and capacity to release
oil at sea) than by concentrating directly on regulating the discharges themselves (which are
relatively unmonitorable)4.
However, it is also important to note that phenomena or activities  can be monitored   by
direct or indirect  means. For example, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel burning can
either be monitored directly, by measuring emissions passing through the power station
chimneys, car exhausts, etc., or indirectly calculated using data on the amounts of fuel burned,
the carbon content of the fuels, and the efficiency of the burning processes. In practice,
indirect measurements can often be more feasible or cost-effective. This is certainly the case
for national emissions of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel-burning. 
Indirect measurement relies upon the establishment of an acceptable methodology for
calculation, as well as the capacity to measure the required data inputs. Such an approach
depends on the existence of an agreed ‘working’ scientific understanding of the relationship
between the activities or processes to which the commitment refers and the measured inputs
required by the methodology. The methodology will have its own uncertainties, in addition to
4
 This, at least, is the conclusion drawn by Mitchell in his study of the effectiveness of MARPOL
agreements relating to intentional oil pollution (Mitchell, 1993, 1994). 
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the uncertainties in the input data. Moreover, scientific understanding of the relationships
involved will change, implying changes in the methodologies and thus in measured
performance in meeting commitments.      
The intrinsic measurability of an activity or material can moreover depend substantially on
the type of commitment with which the verification exercise is associated. Monitoring
whether or not an activity is taking place (did any nuclear dumping at sea take place or not?)
is normally  more reliable than measuring the extent to which it is taking place (was nuclear
dumping within agreed limits?). For this reason, prohibitions are typically more verifiable
than non-zero limits. This is also an ‘assessability’ issue:  evidence of non-compliance is less
ambiguous and less contestable.
In principle, assessments of the inherent monitorability of commitments should to take into
account the possibility that the state or other actors involved will try to camouflage or hide 
monitored substances or activities or distort measurements of them. Some activities are easier
to hide or camouflage than others, due to their inherent characteristics or their place and role 
in society. The scope for such practices will also depend on the character of the monitoring 
systems used, and the extent to which they are independent of the government and other
interested parties in the country whose performance is being monitored. How seriously the
possibility of camouflage or covert activities will be taken in assessing the monitorability of a
given commitment will depend on a variety of judgments relating to the incentives and costs
that would be associated with them. When monitoring relies substantially on self reporting, it
may be relatively easy to neglect to report certain data. The costs of  hiding activities from
independent inspectors or monitoring systems may well be more substantial. The cost of
hiding or disguising the activity may be large, and the restrictions that the covert measures
might place on the value of the hidden substances and activities may well render such
activities unattractive.
  
3.2.2 Infrastructure and monitoring systems
Even if  an activity is inherently monitorable, it may not be possible actually to monitor it
without an adequate infrastructure  of  monitoring platforms, data-collection systems, and
expert or institutional  resources. In principle, the necessary infrastructure and resources for
monitoring could be specially developed for the purposes of  improving treaty verification. In
practice, governments and other interested parties will be reluctant to allocate additional
resources to develop the infrastructure needed for monitoring performance in meeting treaty
commitments if the costs are disproportionate to the benefits of reliable monitoring. 
Thus, assessments of  monitorability must take into account the extent to which an adequate 
monitoring infrastructure is available or is likely to become available. Thus judgments may
have to be made about acceptable costs for developing new monitoring capacity or
infrastructure. Such costs may be political or social as well as economic. For example, new
data-gathering institutions or systems are unlikely to be politically, socially or economically
acceptable unless they are compatible with the existing structures, goals, and values of the
state, society or dominant domestic interest groups. 
Moreover, the measurements and information collected will typically be shaped by
characteristics of the data-gathering infrastructure. For example, data  on the size of cattle
stocks that is collected primarily for the purposes of taxation may well tend to understate
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actual numbers, whereas if  it was collected for the purposes of  distributing agricultural
subsidies one would expect the opposite effect. Similarly, it is important to know whether a
government primarily relies on self-reporting by farmers for such data, or whether they make
use of an extensive system of independent inspectors. Differences between countries or
regions in the  characteristics and purposes of  the monitoring infrastructures they use may
make information on national compliance difficult to compare.
One standard way of  reducing such problems of comparability is to formulate commitments
in relation to changes  from a baseline  established for each country (for example, ‘national
cattle stocks should be 10% smaller in 2000 than they were in 1990’): provided that the data-
collection systems remain the same over the period, any systematic biases associated with
them will apply equally for the ‘baseline’ and ‘target’ years. However, in practice national
monitoring infrastructures will also tend to change with time, and often for reasons that are
unrelated to the environmental agreement or to verification concerns. For example,
bureaucracies may be re-organised, data-gathering systems may change, and new
methodologies adopted. Moreover, the social context will also change, altering the effects of 
‘infrastructural biases’ on the data. Changes in measured national performance in meeting
commitments may thus be an artifact of institutional change, involving perhaps changes in
taxation or subsidy systems, or switching data-collection from use of tax returns to on-
site monitoring. The potential for such infrastructural change, and the likely character of such
changes may affect assessments of monitorability of commitments.
This provides a  further reason for preferring to use independent monitoring systems that are
operated mainly for the purposes of  reliable environmental monitoring, if not solely in the
interests of  ensuring verifiability. However, such independent or dedicated systems will not
always be available or adequate. 
3.2.3 Characteristics of state and society 
Many of the factors determining monitorability discussed in the two subsections above relate
to particular characteristics of  the state or society concerned. However, broader and perhaps
more fundamental political, social and economic characteristics will also be important. 
Societies that are relatively open in relevant areas will tend to regard monitoring and
inspections as less intrusive and costly. Pluralist or democratic societies will be less able to
hide activities involving significant numbers of civilians. Weak states will tend to be less able
to monitor activities by powerful domestic interest groups (but may also be less able to
prevent independent monitoring activities). Activities in countries that are involved in
relations of complex interdependence, and in dense transnational economic, social and
political networks, are different in this context to relatively autonomous and ‘un-networked’
states (such as North Korea, to take an extreme example). Market economies pose different
monitoring challenges than planned economies.
The significance of these societal characteristics for monitorability will partly depend on the
extent to which adequate monitorability relies on the resources or cooperation of the state
concerned. It will also depend on the extent to which the rules and operational procedures for
this cooperation have been formally agreed. Similarly, such societal characteristics may be
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more important where assessments must largely be based self-reporting, rather than on
independent monitoring systems or intrusive inspections. 
As always, broad social, political and economic changes will affect the effectiveness and
character of the infrastructure and monitoring systems required for measurement. The
transformations in the former Soviet Union, for example, have profoundly affected the
monitorability of  its performance in meeting environmental commitments (though perhaps
not always for the better)
3.2.4 The use of indicators as proxies to improve monitorability 
Commitments in environmental agreements frequently relate to substances, processes or
activities other than the ones that the agreement is primarily aiming to affect, limit or prevent.
This may often be because of concerns about verifiability. For example, a  commitment
aiming to limit net greenhouse gas emissions from forestry might be formulated in terms of 
national forest areas, partly because these are more monitorable than emissions. This use of
indicators as proxies in the formulation of commitments is probably  important in the
development and implementation of commitments and, as discussed in section 2.2, is a major 
way in which verifiability issues may be important for environmental  agreements.
However, indicators of performance may also be formally or informally developed to improve
the verifiability of a commitment. Thus, a state’s compliance with a relatively unmonitorable
commitment might be measured by monitoring a range of indicators that are not explicitly
defined in the formal commitments. This is similar in principle to indirect measurement of 
compliance, where an agreed methodology is used to calculate performance in relation to a
treaty commitment on the basis of  data-inputs for relatively monitorable quantities. However,
where even indirect measurement of compliance using an agreed methodology is not possible, 
treaty partners may monitor one or more related  indicators of performance to provide some
reassurance that states are implementing their commitments in good faith. 
For example, it would be impossible reliably to measure compliance with a legal commitment
to reduce national anthropogenic emissions of methane by 10% between 1990 and 2000,
either directly or indirectly. There are many different sources of methane within a country,
and even if  there are relatively reliable indirect methods of calculating annual methane
emissions from some subsectors, these would typically be swamped when aggregated with
estimates of emissions from other sectors where there are great uncertainties. Nevertheless, 
treaty partners may nevertheless try to monitor performance in the subsectors for which
relatively reliable estimates of methane emissions can be obtained, as indicators of overall
performance. Similarly, they may monitor indicators of whether the country is effectively
implementing measures designed to reduce methane emissions in some key sectors. While
this will not  allow compliance with the specific treaty commitment to be measured, it does
establish some relatively measurable informal indicators of performance. 
Such informal indicators may acquire some standing in the agreement. For example, aware
that a commitment to make a 10% reduction in methane emissions cannot in itself be
monitored, countries could informally pledge themselves to a number of more monitorable
targets against which their  performance may be assessed. Alternatively, some or all of their
treaty partners may adopt a number of monitorable standards against  which they decide to
assess performance. Clearly, if there is confusion or disagreement about the use of such
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indicators, this could lead to differing expectations and damaging disputes about compliance.
Thus, the process of formulating or communicating sets of informal indicators could usefully
be facilitated by appropriate implementation review mechanisms. 
  
Indeed, one could envisage the process being further formalised, in order to translate  a
relatively unverifiable treaty commitment into a set of  informal but verifiable pledges. In
regimes where this process could usefully enhance effectiveness, internationally agreed
guidelines and procedures could be developed for the ways in which countries should
formulate, communicate and agree upon such clusters of informal yet relatively monitorable
pledges (Greene & Salt 1994). 
For example,  suppose that a protocol to the FCCC were to include the (relatively
unmonitorable)  legal commitment outlined above -  to reduce national methane emissions by
10% between 1990 and 2000. Each party could informally disaggregated this commitment
into a number  of  more specific pledges on emissions relating to each type of source of
methane, such as landfills, gas distribution, wet-rice production, forestry and agricultural
waste management, customised to its particular methane emissions profile. Thus one country
might one country might pledge itself to meet the overall 10% cut by reducing methane
emissions from landfills and gas distribution by 20% and stabilising emissions from other
sectors. Another country might prefer to achieve its formal commitment by focusing on
reducing emissions from forestry and agricultural waste. The main overall constraint would
be that each country’s set of sub commitments should be shown to be likely to add up at least
to an overall 10% reduction overall, calculated on the basis of agreed methodologies (e.g. the
IPCC methodology) using the baseline data on emissions in 1990 already submitted as part of
the FCCC reporting system. 
At this stage, this set of informal sub-commitments for each sector in each party would still
relate to methane emissions, and would thus remain relatively unmonitorable in most
subsectors. However, through disaggregation, the monitorability of those subsectors which
are relatively amenable to reliable measurement would at least not be undermined by
combining them with unmonitorable emissions from other sub-sectors. However, the
procedure could be for each country to further disaggregate each informal sub commitment
into a cluster of  more monitorable pledges. For example, a sub commitment to reduce
emissions from rice paddies by 10% could be disaggregated into pledges to stabilise areas
under production, reduce average inundation periods by 30%, and adjust varieties of rice
grown and fertilizer practices in specified ways. Similarly, a sub-commitment to limit
methane emissions from landfills could be articulated in terms of pledge to implement
specified changes in landfill management. In each case, the cluster of pledges should be
shown to be likely to achieve the sub commitment in each sector, using agreed
methodologies. 
Thus, through a combination of disaggregation and the articulation of  commitments in terms
of a cluster of  informal pledges relating to relatively monitorable indicators, an
unmonitorable commitment may become relatively verifiable for all practical purposes. The
cluster of indicators of performance may vary from country to country, according to their
particular characteristics and to the ways in which they aim to meet their overall
commitments. Such indicators may relate more closely to the specific policies the government
plans to adopt to meets its agreed environmental targets, and thus to the requirements for
auditing of  domestic implementation by the governments or international aid agencies
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involved. Overall, therefore, such procedures could enhance regime effectiveness in a number
of ways. They could also shape implementation, since performance would now be measured
against the informal indicators rather than the initial commitment.
Such a process may appear unwieldy, and to the author’s knowledge no existing
environmental regime has fully developed such procedures for systematically articulating
relatively  unverifiable commitments into sets of verifiable pledges (or agreed indicators of
national performance). Nevertheless, there are many examples of the use of  informal
indicators of national performance where the formal commitments are relatively
unmonitorable. Without guidelines for the development and communication of these, there is
a danger that different actors may choose unilaterally  to consider different informal
indicators to measure other countries  performance against, according to their concerns and
ability to monitor. These may not be the ones that the country concerned would choose itself,
nor perhaps the most appropriate ones for promoting regime effectiveness.  
The extent to which such informal indicators have been used to improve monitorability is a
relatively new and potentially important area for future research, and so are the effects such
practices may have on the development and implementation of the regime.
3.2.4 Independence and monitorability
International assessments of monitorability could depend significantly on the extent to which
assessments of national performance depend on information reported by the parties about
themselves. Activities or materials in a member country that are  monitorable in principle may
in fact only be monitored by the bodies under the control of the state involved. In such
situations, it becomes important to assess the reliability of the agencies collecting the data,
and of the methodologies they use. How likely are these bodies to be able (and willing) to
resist political pressures from state authorities or domestic interests to distort or suppress
information that would indicate inadequate performance or non-compliance? Are the
methodologies used compatible with those used for other parties, so that data-reported can be
interpreted and compared?.
The answers to such questions will vary according to a variety of factors, relating, for
example, to the type of information required and to the interests of the state concerned in
collecting accurate data. For instance, reliable energy statistics are important to the states for a
variety of important economic reasons, providing reassurance that they would not distort them
simply for the purposes of under-reporting CO2 emissions to the climate change convention.
However, there is always the risk that the country may maintain parallel accounting systems:
one for internal use and one for international reporting. The recent revelations about Soviet
misreporting to the International Whaling Commission are an example of this latter practice,
and was entirely successful for decades (Guardian, 1994).
For this reason, many people might be tempted to insist that the availability of  entirely
independent monitoring systems is a pre-condition for adequate verifiability. Adequate and
entirely independent monitoring  may be possible in some cases, particularly where
performance can be monitored using remote sensing technologies. In general, however, the
permission and resources will not be given to establish entirely  independent monitoring
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systems. Thus, substantial reliance will typically have to be placed on information provided
by the governments and national agencies in the countries being monitored.
In general, self-reporting by some states will be more widely trusted than by others, according
to their reputation and past performance, and according to the characteristics of the society or
state concerned. As discussed above, for example, some states have greater capacity to
monitor domestic activities reliably or have more independent domestic reliability checks
than others. Similarly, the likelihood that government misreporting will be exposed by whistle
blowers or opposition groups is greater in open or democratic societies. 
Nevertheless, judgments about the reliability of self-reporting are always uncertain and
contestable. Thus, confidence in the reliability of measurements will always tend to be
improved by increasing capacity to independently monitor relevant activities, or at least to be
able to independently check the reliability of national reports.  Since it is generally not
diplomatic to identify countries whose national reports are relatively untrustworthy, where
such independent monitoring and checking procedures are established they will tend to apply
to all parties.   
       
One approach to increasing confidence in national reports is to increase the transparency of
the process by which national reports are produced. One type of independent check is the
ability of outside observers to examine or monitor the raw or semi-processed data collected or
produced by different agencies and mechanisms within the state concerned. Even if each
agency is susceptible to domestic pressures, their susceptibility will vary between agencies. In
any case, it is likely to be complex and costly to  "fix" the data without generating observable
inconsistencies may be great. 
Similarly, the more disaggregated data provided in government reports, the greater the
confidence in the reliability of reported measurements of performance (although, for the un-
initiated, exposure to the normal chaos, uncertainties and inconsistencies in official (or
unofficial) statistics could undermine their confidence in the reporting process). In the same
way, systems for clarifying or harmonising national methodologies for collecting and
analysing data will tend to improve international confidence in measurements of performance.
In this context, the capacity of actors other than the state concerned  to use data provided by
that state to monitor implementation of commitments depends on a combination of: 
(i) the state’s own monitoring capabilities (which depend on all of the physical, infrastructural
and societal characteristics discussed above);
(ii) the nature of the national systems used to carry out such monitoring activities (are they
directly under national government control?; what role do semi-autonomous national agencies
play in the process?; are they appropriately resourced?; what are the interests of the agencies
involved? as discussed above); 
(iii) the transparency of the process by which national reports are compiled.
(iv) the rights and opportunities to review national reports, ask for and obtain clarification, or
conduct country visits to clarify uissues arising from the national reports.
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A second type of independent check is to compare the information in national reports with
alternative, independently-collected data. That is, to compare national reports with the results
of monitoring or measurements carried out by observers or agencies that are not under the
control of individual states concerned. 
In some cases, activities or materials can be monitored in ways that do not depend on any
cooperation of the states in which they are situated. For example, the physical characteristics
of the objects or activities to be monitored may be such that remote sensing techniques may
be used. In others, relevant data can be collected by monitoring outside state boundaries or
state jurisdiction (for example transboundary river or air pollution, or trading practices). 
Alternatively, independent transnational or domestic non-state actors (or ‘independent’
regional authorities) may be in a position to monitor or measure relevant activities or
materials. In some cases, some  non-state groups may be in a position by themselves to
monitor national compliance with a commitment - for example, a sole national producer of a
restricted ozone depleting substance, or citizens groups able to detect  a particular  prohibited
activity (such as whaling, or illegal discharges in rivers). In general, however, such groups
can only gather partial information. 
To measure overall national activities or materials, a combination of such information from a
range of sources is necessary. Typically,  only the state involved has established systems for
such comprehensive information gathering (or, indeed, the right to demand such information
from companies or individuals). This is particularly the case when the commitment relates to
widely diffused and legitimate activities (fishing, waste disposal, etc.). 
However, given the will and resources, independent monitoring systems can be established in
association with the international agreement for the purpose of collecting independent
information or of integrating available information from a variety of  state and non-state
sources. These systems may require the cooperation of the inspected state: for example
including arrangements for on-site inspections, independent interviews with relevant officials
or citizens, or cooperation in exposing activities to remote sensors. The ability to
independently monitor will, as before,  depend on a combination of the inherent
characteristics, monitoring infrastructure, and the broader characteristics of the states and
societies involved. For example, the characteristics of the societies involved will affect the
extent to which states are willing and able to cooperate with independent monitoring.
Independent monitoring systems may be operated by an international organisation or
Secretariat, or by individual states or groups of states or by non-state actors. How these
systems are operated, and who has rights of access to the information gathered, is potentially
significant. Different actors and institutions will have different stakes and concerns in the
regime, and differential access to information will obviously affect different groups’ capacity
to monitor relevant activities and materials. For example, reliance on national technical means
of monitoring  relevant activities will mean that rich countries with well-developed
monitoring systems (pre-eminently the United States in most areas) will have much greater
capacity to measure performance than  poorer  countries with little national monitoring
capacity. Alternatively, if independent monitoring systems are developed within an
international institution of which all parties are members with equal rights to information, the
differences in monitoring capacity of parties will be reduced. However, unless the information
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collected by such international systems is publicly available, non-state actors will have
relatively little capacity to monitor performance. 
3.3 Assessability
Verifiability is a combination of  ‘assessability’ as well as monitorability. The ability to assess
commitments depends on the extent to which measured behaviour or materials can be
compared against a standard. This depends on the precision with which a commitment or
standard is defined and on the capacity to make assessments. 
3.3.1 The existence on an adequate standard
To a large extent, assessability will depend on the precision with which the commitment is
defined or expressed in the agreement: that is, on the existence of a well-defined  and
commensurable standard. If the commitment itself is ambiguous, an assessment of compliance
would  be difficult even if the information available on performance in relevant activities
were perfectly complete and reliable. 
This commitment or standard may be formally defined in a written international agreement.
However, it could also often be defined through political understandings about the
interpretation of formal commitments. Standards may also be informally established by tacit
agreement or informal cooperation (for example, through Tit-for-Tat games).  Moreover,  for
a given commitment, acceptable standards may be informally accepted to be somewhat
different to those formally defined in the treaty or explicit political agreements: for example,
there may be an informal  understanding between parties to turn a blind eye to deviance from
the formally-defined rules within certain limits. In principle, what matters in this context is
the extent to which  the parties assessing compliance have in one way or another established
clear standards against which performance can be assessed. 
As discussed in section 2.2.4 above, a treaty commitment that is relatively unamenable to
reliable measurement may be disaggregated, refined or re-expressed in terms of proxies or a
cluster of sub-commitments in a way that improves monitorability. The assessability of
commitments may also be affected by such a process. For example, the process could make
more specific the standards against  which the informal indicators of performance will be
compared or by simplifying standards so that compliance becomes easier to assess. The
ability to informally develop clear standards to improve (or perhaps reduce) assessability will
not only depend on the intentions of the participants, but also often on whether there are
appropriate implementation review and dispute resolution processes to facilitate their
development. 
3.3.2 The capacity to make assessments
Assessability also depends on the ability to analyse the information obtained through
monitoring,  to compare the results of the analysis with the appropriate standards, and to
arrive at conclusions. 
For many agreements, there is a very large amount of  relevant information  available, in
national reports, dedicated monitoring systems or from a wide variety of other official and
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unofficial sources. Procedures and resources are required even to gather this information from
the various sources and to organise it. Further, the resources required to analyse it, and to
compare the results appropriately with defined standards may be substantial. Not all parties
may be able to find these resources when they want them. 
However, for some agreements, assessability may depend relatively little on national
resources. Much of the technical task of  organising and analysing information to compare
performance with standards may be delegated to the Secretariat or an international expert
body, providing a common basis on which parties can judge compliance and equalising the
parties’ capacity to make such assessments. 
International secretariats and international technical bodies are notoriously under resourced,
however, and may have only limited ability to carry out proper comparisons of performance
with commitments. Moreover, the extent to which a multilateral body can actually make
serious assessments of compliance will depend greatly on its decision-making procedures and
rules, and may not be capable of making critical assessments of compliance except in extreme
circumstances. Even when such multilateral assessment systems have been established, each
of the parties, and other groups with an interest can assess compliance individually or in
groups. However, their assessments may vary according to the use of different standards at
least as much as different measuring and assessment capabilities.
3.4 Assessments of verifiability in regime development 
In principle, the verifiability of a commitment is judged by combining assessments of its
measurability and accessibility. However, the factors determining these two properties are
many, and judgments relating to each factor will be typically be based on uncertain or
contestable information or assumptions. It will often be difficult for interested parties to
assess their ability to verify a commitment until they have gained practical monitoring and
assessment experience. Even then, judgments about verifiability will vary, partly because
parties  capacities  will actually be different, but also they will have different views on the
importance of  having independent sources of information about national performance, and on
‘how much verifiability is enough’.
There are several types of questions that parties could ask about verifiability. Different
questions are likely to be more salient at different stages in the development of the
environmental regime. 
At an early stage, question about verifiability arise when policy makers are assessing whether
to enter negotiations for an agreement, and in what area. In this context, assessments of
verifiability may be needed in order to judge whether there is a reasonable prospect of
achieving an adequately verifiable agreement in this area (or of avoiding one, if parties seek
merely symbolic agreements). Such assessments will relate to perceptions of the
monitorability of relevant activities or possible proxies. They may also relate to the extent to
which it is possible to develop a capacity for independent monitoring and for checking
reliability of national reports, taking into account the character and identity of potential treaty
partners.  
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In the context of environmental treaties, where questions of verification have rarely been
dominant during the process of establishing a new regime, the requirements for assessing
potential verifiability at this stage would probably be undemanding. To the extent that
decision-makers care about adequate verifiability when deciding whether even to enter into
negotiations, they  may only want to be assured that there were at least some potential
relevant commitments that could be adequately verified at reasonable cost. Nevertheless,
perceptions of verifiability may play a role in agenda-setting for detailed negotiations.
At the negotiating stage,  actors are deciding  upon the design of the agreement and the
formulation and stringency various commitments. In the process of formulating and defining
types of commitments, it is the relative verifiability of potential  commitments that most
needs to be assessed, including a balance of the costs of verifying different commitments. In
negotiating the stringency of a particular commitment, then ‘strategic’ concerns about free-
riding and such like may come into play, in which case more detailed assessments of absolute
verifiability, and the requirements and potential costs of achieving  ‘adequate’ verifiability for
specific commitments  may also be desired. Such concerns about achieving  adequate
verifiability of preferred commitments may be important in defining and shaping reporting
and transparency rules, independent checking and inspection rights, and implementation
review procedures, and in the design and development of  additional monitoring facilities or
infrastructures. 
Once the negotiations are complete, the main concern is whether or not to join the agreement.
In this context, each party may want to judge the overall verifiability of the agreement. The
verifiability of some commitments may be less acceptable than for others, but each party will
have to judge the  overall acceptability of the package. Each actor will probably have different
views about the relative importance of various provisions in the agreement;  judgments about
whether the agreement is adequately verifiable (or too verifiable) may in principle  involve
assessments of the verifiability of  each commitment (weighted according to the importance
or stringency of the commitment) combined with judgments about the prospects for
addressing deficiencies in future. The central question for those that want a verifiable
agreement would be whether treaty partners’ compliance with the key commitments is likely
to be adequately verifiable.
At the stage when the agreement is being implemented and maintained,  assessments of
verifiability may be relevant in a range of contexts. Firstly, each party may make assessments
about the extent to which its own performance can adequately be verified by others. To the
extent that this contributes to decisions about how and whether to implement its
commitments, assessments will focus on the risks of exposure of  inadequate compliance.
However, where the party is concerned to promote confidence that it is honouring its
commitments, or to promote the extent to which others can learn from its own practices, this
exercise may lead to parties increasing transparency or inviting independent officials and
experts to monitor or participate in its programmes. 
Secondly, parties may want to assess the extent to which they can verify compliance by
others, leading them perhaps to: allocating additional resources to national or international
monitoring systems; requesting further information from treaty partners; invoking provisions
for independent reviews or assessments of other parties performance; attempting to develop
implementation review processes; or agenda-setting for the further negotiations to improve
verifiability or to revise or develop commitments. Assessments of  the monitorability of 
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performance by various countries, and problems of national reports, may inform the allocation
of additional resources for building some states  national monitoring capacities.
In the context of discussions about developing or revising the regime, re-assessments of
verifiability  may  be made in the light of experience. Such re-assessments may shape debates
about the further elaboration or development of  commitments and verification and
monitoring procedures. Otherwise, the overall aims of assessing verifiability will be similar to
those noted above in relation to the agenda-setting and negotiation phases, except that they
take place in the context of experience and established verification and implementation
review processes relating to the existing treaty. 
4 DYNAMICS OF VERIFIABILITY
4.1 Changes in verifiability
Verifiability can change with time in a variety of ways, as is readily apparent from the
discussion of the determinants of verifiability in section 3. Briefly, monitorability can change
due to: changes in scientific (natural and social) and technical understanding; developments
of monitoring technologies; identification of better indirect means of measurement or the use
of indicators as proxies; developments in national and international monitoring
infrastructures; and changes in societal norms and characteristics. Assessability may change
as ambiguities in commitments are resolved; commitments and standards are refined,
interpreted and developed; and capacity for carrying out assessments changes.   
For most environmental issue areas and types of commitment, there is a great deal of scope
for deliberate improvements in monitorability. New monitoring devices can be developed and
national or international (or unofficial) monitoring systems can be put into place for the
purpose. Research into new and more effective indirect measuring methodologies or proxies
can be carried out. New transparency rules and rights for independent checks and inspections
can be negotiated. These improvements would probably generally be driven by demand,
whether from the some or all of the states parties or from other actors with an interest in 
improving or shaping verifiability 
 However, even without such  purposeful activities, the verifiability of a given commitments
will continue to change as a result of broader technical, institutional, economic, political and
social processes. Moreover such unplanned ‘supply’ processes can present new opportunities
for deliberate improvements in monitorability
Such changes will clearly affect the extent to which the ability to verify affects effectiveness.
The various mechanisms by which this may take place (discussed in section 2) will operate in
different ways as monitoring and assessment capacities of various interested parties change. 
Changes in verifiability may also shape the further development of the regime. By changing
cost-benefit calculations, empowering actors with an interest in such commitments, or
promoting learning about the adequacy or implementation of commitments, improvements in
verifiability may facilitate the negotiation of more stringent obligations or the addition of new
ones. Alternatively, they may encourage higher levels of compliance with existing standards,
increasing confidence in the regime and promoting its further development. On the other
hand, such improvements may threaten to expose inadequate performance, prompting parties
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to leave the agreement or negotiate less stringent commitments. Either way, changes in
relative verifiability of  potential obligations may shape debates about the revision or
reinterpretation of  the agreement. 
The impact of changes in verifiability may  depend on the stage in the development of the
regime in which they occur. During agenda-setting phases, they may be particularly
influential in shaping the negotiating agenda, since these are by definition times of  flexibility
where there are fewer institutional or negotiating constraints in adapting to new information.
When parties are deciding whether to join the agreement, or whether to sign new protocols,
such changes could affect assessments of adequacy of verifiability.
4.2 Changes in standards of adequacy of verifiability 
Answers to the question ‘how much verifiability is enough?’ will not only vary between
parties and other actors, but will also change with time. Changes in perceived interests in the
regime or in perceived incentives for non-compliance amongst treaty partners will tend to
lead to changes in verification requirements. These may arise as a result of a re-assessment of
the regime (or changes in the regime) and of  the costs and benefits of  complying with it.
They could also arise because of  changes in broader political and economic relationships
between parties.  For example, political or economic changes in one or more of the parties
(such as the collapse of  Soviet-style communism or, less radically, a change of government)
may change mutual confidence or change the societal context in which verification takes
place. 
Moreover, as  new obligations are added, verification requirements for existing obligations
may change - for example, a new obligation may be regarded as being more stringent for
some parties than others, and the quid pro quo might be stricter adherence to existing
obligations by other parties.  Even without formal changes in obligations, changes in informal
or tacit agreements about acceptable deviance from standards may lead to changes in
verification requirements. For example, if one party is under pressure (perhaps from domestic
rather than international sources) to adhere strictly  to formal standards, it might be concerned
that to pressure other participants to do so too. 
Changes in assessments of the adequacy of  existing verification capacity in an established
agreement would normally be expected to lead initially to attempts to increase verifiability
rather than to abandonment of obligations. Improvements in verifiability can be achieved
unilaterally or multilaterally, in all of the ways indicated above.  In many cases,
improvements could probably be achieved at modest cost by increased scrutiny of national
reports, improved monitoring technologies, and increased resources for existing  institutions
involved with verification. However, it is possible that achieving adequate verifiability may
involve renegotiation of transparency or inspection rules, and perhaps further re-definition or
interpretation of  commitments and standards. The extent to which this can be achieved
without damage to the regime will depend partly on the existence and design of dispute
resolution and implementation review mechanisms.
 
5. SOME ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
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The aim of this paper  is to explore the determinants of verifiability, and the possible
relationship between verifiability and regime development and effectiveness, in order to
identify potentially  important areas for further research. This last section therefore aims to
outline possible areas for research rather than to provide conclusions. 
A number of  questions and potential areas for research have been raised in the course of the
paper. Hopefully, by raising awareness of  the potential significance of verifiability, the issues
raised will be taken into account in the course of  empirical work on the development and
effectiveness of  particular regimes, and thus help to improve overall understanding of the
processes involved. The following paragraphs aim to select some of the potentially most
important or interesting areas for specific research that have been raised. 
5.1. To what extent do concerns about verifiability affect environmental commitments or
participation in agreements? 
The discussion has identifies a number of  reasons why states and other interested parties
(international and domestic) may care about verifiability when they are negotiating
commitments or deciding whether to participate in an agreement.  It is widely recognised that
such concerns play a significant role in other issue areas, and particularly in relation to arms
control. Little empirical research has so far been carried out to determine the extent to which
such concerns have been important in the formulation of commitments and the development
of environmental agreements, and if they are not, why not.  
Research could focus not only on the importance of the ‘absolute’ verifiability of  
commitments to verification, but also to the importance of  differences in the abilities of
interested parties to verify -  such asymmetries could be due to a variety of  social and
technical factors, but they could significantly affect distributions of  power, calculations of
interests, and learning processes.
5.2 The importance of  verifiability of commitments for the development and
effectiveness of  implementation review mechanisms
By definition, verifiability is a necessary condition for an effective verification process.
Moreover,  the ability to assess the extent to which parties are complying with commitments
must be a potentially  important factor in determining the effectiveness of implementation
review mechanisms (IRMs). In Victor et al (1994) and elsewhere, we have argued  that IRMs
may play an important role in determining the effectiveness of environmental agreements. In
this context, the role of verifiability is a potentially important area for research into the
determinants of the effectiveness and development of  environmental agreements. A range of
different types of  possible research issues arise:
- How does verifiability relate to the design and operation of IRMs? For example, when 
commitments are verifiable using existing monitoring systems and data to which there is wide
access (that is,  when transparency is high for a wide range of non-state and state actors), to
what extent is the development of elaborate formal IRMs necessary for effective
implementation review (to what extent can informal processes together with minimal
consultative procedures suffice?). How do asymmetries in the ability to verify between parties
affect the development of IRMs?   
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- What are the differences in effectiveness and the role of  verification and implementation
review when interested parties can monitor performance using independent information rather
than mainly using information reported by the country concerned.  What are the differing
design considerations for  effective IRMs as the balance between using independent
information and national reporting varies?
- How do the characteristics of the monitorability of  a commitment affect participation and
influence in the implementation review process. For example, how does access to monitoring
information affect the role of non-state actors in IRMs?
5.3  The role of proxies and indicators of performance in increasing verifiability, and in
shaping the development and operation of IRMs
As discussed  in earlier sections, commitments in environmental agreements frequently relate
to proxies rather than to the activities or substances that the agreement is mainly concerned to
regulate, limit or prevent. Similarly, where formal commitments are relatively unverifiable, a
variety of indicators  may be formally or informally used to monitor and assess performance.
The choice of  indicators to be used as proxies is clearly likely to be a political as well as a
technical process, since it affects the impact of the agreement and the verifiability of 
commitments. Moreover, different interested parties may use different informal indicators
according to their interests and monitoring capacities. 
The development and role of indicators as proxies may  often be very important factors in the
development, shape, and impact of IRMs and of the commitments and implementation
policies themselves.  They also provide potential connections between international
commitments and implementation of domestic policies or international assistance
programmes, since governments and other actors will typically also identify targets and
indicators for the implementation of domestic policies or activities relevant to the agreement.
Research could include empirical or historical work on the role and development of indicators
in relation to IRMs, commitments and implementation in existing or emerging  regimes, or in
relation to particular countries. There is also the question of  examining the different purposes
for which indicators are used, and the relationship between their use in domestic
implementation, international review, or technology transfer/aid programmes,  or between the
use made by non-state actors and states parties. Further, research could be conducted on 
guidelines and design principles for IRMs so that the identification and development of
indicators is more likely to improve regime effectiveness.
5.4 How do monitoring facilities relate to the implementation of conventions? 
Most monitoring facilities and data-gathering infrastructures relevant to the verifiability of
commitments in an agreement were not custom-built for that agreement. For example,
implementation of  commitments relating to land use might be able to be monitored using
existing FAO systems and remote sensing facilities (satellites and such like). Verifiability
depends on access to such data, and the capacity to use or adapt existing information and
facilities. Similarly, a cluster of conventions covering related  issue areas could make use of
the same monitoring resources, and there is potential for cooperative investment and use of
monitoring facilities. There are a number of  opportunities for policy-relevant empirical
research here. It might also be important to examine the emergence of an international regime
relating to rules of access to environmental monitoring data, and to the development of
generic monitoring (and assessment) capabilities.
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5.5 Determinants and characteristics of monitorability
The factors determining monitorability are discussed in this paper. They include: intrinsic
characteristics of the substances or activities concerned, available monitoring resources and
data-gathering infrastructures (bearing in mind acceptable costs), and the social, economic
and political characteristics of the states and societies concerned. There is potential for
specific examinations of the monitorability of  substances, activities, or indicators of interests
to existing or emerging regimes. Also,  the analysis of the general physical and social
determinants of  the monitorability of ‘Substance X’ or ‘Activitiy Y’, as discussed in section
3.2, could  usefully be developed further.
5.6 What is the relationship between changes in monitorability and changes in
implementation and development of regimes?
The monitorability of commitments can change as a result of  changes in monitoring science
and technology, investment in monitoring and data-gathering infrastructures, and political,
economic or social changes in the states concerned. These changes may be a result of the
development or implementation of the regime, but also (and more often) as a result of 
exogenous factors. Such changes could affect the possibilities for: negotiating new
commitments;  implementation practices; or the development and effectiveness of IRMs; and
how do they affect participation by NGOs, IOs and states in all of these processes? Empirical
examinations of the role of changes in monitorability in regime and IRM development and
implementation are possible.
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